The Roots of the Living Constitution by Balkin, Jack M
 1129 
PANELIST PAPERS 
THE ROOTS OF THE LIVING CONSTITUTION 
JACK M. BALKIN∗ 
INTRODUCTION: A TREE GROWS IN AMERICA .............................................. 1129 
 I. COMMON-LAW EVOLUTION OR REGIME MAINTENANCE? ................ 1134 
 II. COMMON-LAW DECISION MAKING OR DEMOCRATIC 
CONSTITUTIONALISM? ....................................................................... 1138 
 III. COMMON-LAW ADJUSTMENT AND PARTISAN ENTRENCHMENT ....... 1145 
 IV. COMMON-LAW GRADUALISM VS. CONSTITUTIONAL REVOLUTION .. 1149 
 V. COMMON-LAW DECISION MAKING AND DEMOCRATIC 
LEGITIMACY ...................................................................................... 1153 
CONCLUSION ................................................................................................. 1160 
 
INTRODUCTION: A TREE GROWS IN AMERICA 
On the cover of David Strauss’s The Living Constitution1 is a magical tree.  
The metaphor of a tree connotes what is living and organic; it also suggests 
Canada’s doctrine of a constitution as a living tree.2  The tree sits above a 
parchment copy of the Constitution, suggesting that the real Constitution grows 
out of and transcends the ancient text.  Branches of the tree radiate in all 
directions, and in place of ordinary leaves there are stars, perhaps standing for 
famous judicial decisions such as Brown v. Board of Education3 or McCulloch 
v. Maryland.4 
The book’s cover symbolizes important features of Strauss’s argument.  
Strauss believes that the real constitution in the United States is not its text, but 
a living, growing thing beyond the text that has evolved through common-law 
decision making, and that its central features and many of its proudest 
accomplishments are judicial decisions.5 
 
∗ Knight Professor of Constitutional Law and the First Amendment, Yale Law School.  
My thanks to Akhil Amar and Sanford Levinson for comments on a previous draft. 
1 DAVID A. STRAUSS, THE LIVING CONSTITUTION (2010). 
2 Edwards v. Canada (Attorney General) [1930], A.C. 124 (P.C.) (appeal taken from 
S.C.C.) (“The British North America Act planted in Canada a living tree capable of growth 
and expansion within its natural limits.”). 
3 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
4 17 U.S. 316 (1819). 
5 See STRAUSS, supra note 1, at 3 (“Our constitutional system, without our fully realizing 
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In this Essay, I will not be focusing on the branches of the tree or on its 
starry leaves. Instead I shall focus on what lies beneath these aspects of 
constitutional development and makes them possible. That is, this Essay is 
about the roots of the tree.  Because Strauss’s book is primarily about the 
leaves – famous Supreme Court decisions and other doctrinal developments – 
it is necessarily incomplete.  This Essay offers supplements to his argument, 
emphasizing things that Strauss himself does not talk much about in the book 
but which I think are necessary to make his tree grow. 
Strauss’s goals are announced early in the book.  He asks, “[D]o we have a 
living constitution that changes over time?”6  His answer is an emphatic yes. 
But the problem, as Strauss sees it, is how it is possible to “have a constitution 
that is both living, adapting, and changing and, simultaneously, invincibly 
stable and impervious to human manipulation.”7  The answer, Strauss believes, 
lies in the traditions, practices, and ideology of the English common law that 
was transported to American soil with American colonists.  “[A]t the core of 
our constitutional tradition – our living constitutional tradition – [is] an 
approach derived from the common law and based on precedent and 
tradition.”8  “Our constitutional system,” he explains “has become a common 
law system, one in which precedent and past practices are, in their own way, as 
important as the written U.S. Constitution itself.”9  Such a “common law 
constitution” has distinct advantages.  It “is a ‘living’ constitution, but it is also 
one that can protect fundamental principles against transient public opinion[,] 
[a]nd it is not one that judges (or anyone else) can simply manipulate to fit 
their own ideas.” 10  Attending to the common-law approach, Strauss contends, 
“shows how the Constitution can evolve and yet still provide the solid 
principles that a constitution should provide – and not become the plaything of 
judges.” 11 
Both Strauss’s statement of the problem and his solution make judges and 
the judiciary central to living constitutionalism.  He asks how we can explain 
constitutional adaptation outside the amendment process that (1) constrains 
judges so that the Constitution does not become their “plaything” but that (2) 
protects fundamental rights from merely “transient public opinion.”  Strauss is 
responding to various conservative and originalist arguments about the 
judiciary that have been made over the years.  These arguments maintain that 
 
it, has tapped into an ancient source of law . . . .  That ancient kind of law is the common 
law.  The common law is a system built not on an authoritative . . . text like the Constitution.  
Rather, the common law is built out of precedents and traditions that accumulate over 
time.”). 
6 Id. at 2. 
7 Id. at 2. 
8 Id. at 4. 
9 Id. at 3. 
10 Id. 
11 Id. at 4. 
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in a system of living constitutionalism judges are lawless and that the very idea 
of a living Constitution is a license to make things up.12  Strauss sees 
conservative originalists as his primary adversary.  Yet by stating the key 
questions of the book in this way, he demonstrates that he actually agrees with 
his opponents on a central point: the central focus of constitutional 
interpretation is and should be judges, and the central problem that living 
constitutionalism faces is constraining judicial behavior. 
In my view, that is not the best way to frame the question of living 
constitutionalism.  No one denies that judges are significant players in 
constitutional development, but they are merely one element among many.  In 
fact, the most important drivers of constitutional change are constitutional 
constructions and state building by the political branches, the judicial 
appointments process, litigation campaigns, political and social mobilizations, 
and the efforts of civil-society organizations.  American constitutional 
development features a variety of players and institutions that continually 
struggle over what is reasonable and unreasonable, “on the wall” and “off the 
wall” in constitutional culture. 
Viewed in the larger context of this struggle over constitutional culture, 
judges turn out to be not the reckless unconstrained tyrants of popular 
imagination, but institutionally embedded actors within a larger system of 
political and cultural power.  Judicial constraint does occur within that system, 
but for the most part it occurs not because judges consciously follow a single 
correct method of interpretation, but because a host of different institutional 
factors limit who can become a judge, structure judicial decision making, and 
influence the professional and constitutional culture in which judges reason 
and attempt to persuade their audiences.  Strauss’s book is not primarily about 
these features of American political institutions and constitutional culture; he 
refers to them, if at all, only glancingly.  But no account of the living 
Constitution is complete without them.  Indeed, perhaps a better way to 
describe the living Constitution is as the sum of these various processes of 
constitutional development.13 
Strauss’s project is both descriptive and normative.  His descriptive goal is 
to explain how the Constitution actually develops over time.  His normative 
goal is to show why common-law decision making is superior to living 
constitutionalism’s primary competitor, originalism. 
Strauss recognizes that contemporary originalism is not one theory but 
many; some versions of originalism, he points out, are hardly different from 
his own vision of living constitutionalism.14  He opposes those forms of 
 
12 See id. at 31 (observing originalist objections that  “the living Constitution is infinitely 
flexible and has no content other than the views of the person who is doing the 
interpreting”). 
13 This is the account of living constitutionalism discussed in chapters 13 and 14 of JACK 
M. BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM (2011). 
14 STRAUSS, supra note 1, at 10-11. 
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originalism that claim that the correct interpretation of the words of the 
Constitution must be consistent with “the understandings of the people who 
were responsible for including those words in the first place.”15  That is, “[i]f a 
constitutional provision was generally understood to permit or forbid 
something when it was adopted, then it must be understood in the same way 
today.”16 
Most originalists since the 1980s have argued that what is binding is the 
original meaning of the text, not the original intentions of its drafters or the 
original understandings of the adopters.17  In this respect, Strauss’s account is 
not completely accurate, because he conflates original understandings with 
original meanings.  Nevertheless, the word “meaning” itself has many 
meanings.  My own approach, framework originalism, argues that fidelity to 
“original meaning” requires fidelity to the semantic meanings of the words in 
the text at the time of adoption, including generally recognized terms of art.  
For example, it turns out that “equal protection” means the same thing today as 
it did in 1868, when the Fourteenth Amendment was adopted.  In a few cases, 
however, the original semantic meanings are different from the ones we expect 
today.  The word “magazines” in Article I, Section 8 refers to places to store 
ammunition, not glossy publications, and “domestic violence” in Article IV, 
Section 4 refers to civil unrest or insurrection, not spousal battery.18  This 
account of original meaning is broadly consistent with Strauss’s version of 
living constitutionalism, because it leaves open considerable space for the 
construction of the Constitution’s vague, abstract, or open-ended commitments 
over time. 
On the other hand, “original meaning” might be far thicker: it might include 
the original principles, purposes, expectations, or assumptions of the adopting 
generation.  Many modern originalists – especially the conservative originalists 
that Strauss criticizes – adopt this thicker conception of meaning; accordingly, 
they treat the expectations and statements of principle made by the adopting 
generation either as part of original meaning or as an important guide to 
original meaning.19  Strauss’s objection to originalism is really an objection to 
this thicker version of original meaning. 
Strauss’s descriptive claim is that living constitutionalism is, in essence, a 
process of common-law decision making that relies on precedent and tradition.  
Strauss’s normative claim is that originalism – or at least the variety he 
discusses and objects to in the book – is unworkable.  Common-law decision 
making, by contrast, is eminently practicable and strikes the right balance 
 
15 Id. at 10. 
16 Id. at 11. 
17 BALKIN, supra note 13, at 100-08. 
18 Id. at 35-58. 
19 Id. at 100-08 (“[A]lthough most conservative originalists claim that they seek only to 
follow original meaning, they tend in practice to conflate original meaning with original 
expected application.”). 
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between the past and the present.  It is flexible but not lawless, adaptable to 
circumstance yet constrained by long tradition.  It protects fundamental rights 
from transient public opinion and adapts to changing times without becoming a 
plaything of the judges. 
Thus, the common-law method, Strauss believes, simultaneously explains 
how the Constitution adapts to changing times and how it nevertheless 
constrains judges so that they aren’t simply making things up.  Common-law 
processes of precedent and tradition are America’s real Constitution. 
What about the constitutional text?  Strauss believes that the text plays a 
relatively limited role in constitutional interpretation.  In most cases, the text is 
not particularly important and not very helpful in deciding contested legal 
questions.  Rather, it serves primarily as a focal point that settles certain 
questions in advance, coordinates political action, and solves collective action 
problems.20  The constitutional text ensures that the participants in the political 
system do not have to fight over certain things – for example, when the 
President’s term ends or when a new administration begins – questions that 
might prove very messy if they were subject to ordinary political contestation 
or vague standards.  We are required to follow the text not because the Framers 
created it or because the adopters adopted it, but because failing to follow the 
text would destabilize politics.21  (I offer various criticisms of this account in 
Living Originalism, which I will not repeat here.)22 
If we want to understand constitutional interpretation in the United States, 
Strauss argues, we may safely ignore the text and focus instead on the practice 
of common-law decision making.  Common-law decision making, Strauss 
believes, has important virtues.  It combines stability with adaptability.  It 
prevents constitutional doctrines from changing too quickly, while nevertheless 
allowing substantial change over time.  It draws on past judgments and past 
wisdom.  It looks to what many different people have thought valuable over 
long periods of time and treats this as the baseline for sound judgment.  It 
focuses on what has worked well in the past, and it gradually adjusts current 
practices to changing conditions.  In this way, the common-law method 
economizes both on virtue and wisdom. 
This is a familiar justification of the common law, which Strauss adapts to 
the problem of constitutional development.  In fact, we might say that Strauss 
 
20 STRAUSS, supra note 1, at 104-05. 
21 Id. at 105-06.  Strauss does not deal with the converse problem, in which the incentive 
effects of clear rules might destabilize politics over the long run.  Mark Graber has argued, 
for example, that the 1787 Constitution’s decision to rely exclusively on Congressmen and 
Senators elected from local jurisdictions (rather than at-large seats chosen nationally) made 
political compromise difficult in the 1850s and helped bring on the Civil War.  See MARK 
A. GRABER, DRED SCOTT AND THE PROBLEM OF CONSTITUTIONAL EVIL 36 (2006) (“When 
public opinion on any bitterly contested issue is geographically concentrated, an institution 
staffed exclusively by persons elected by local constituencies is unlikely to be capable of 
reaching a middle ground.”). 
22
 See BALKIN, supra note 13, at 35-58. 
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is engaged in a sort of second-order common-law reasoning.  He draws on the 
received wisdom of the past about the advantages of the common law and 
applies it to the question of constitutional method.  Common-law decision 
making, he contends, works well in preserving what is valuable while adapting 
to changing times.  Originalism, by contrast, is a rigid method that cannot 
perform this function. 
That is Strauss’s account of the tree.  Now let us look at the roots. 
I. COMMON-LAW EVOLUTION OR REGIME MAINTENANCE? 
First, consider Strauss’s descriptive account.  The Living Constitution 
focuses primarily on the branches and leaves of the tree – decisions by the 
Supreme Court.  For most of the book, the legal texts Strauss discusses are 
almost exclusively majority and dissenting opinions of the Supreme Court, 
except when he explains the common-law method through examples taken 
from the opinions of common-law courts.23  Reading these chapters, one might 
well be forgiven for thinking that Strauss believes that the living Constitution 
is just common-law decision making by the federal courts and especially the 
U.S. Supreme Court.  But that is not really his position, although he does not 
state it clearly.  In the book’s final chapter – on the irrelevance of 
constitutional amendments – the focus suddenly shifts to customary practices 
within the political branches, the states’ elimination of property requirements 
for voting, the growth of presidential power, and the development of the 
regulatory and administrative state.24  Strauss also notes how amendments 
sometimes ratify changes that have already occurred in social custom and 
legislative practices;25 conversely, Strauss points out that some constitutional 
amendments are effectively irrelevant or have limited efficacy until public 
opinion “catches up” with the ideas behind the amendment.26  What Strauss 
means by “common law decisionmaking,” then, must include more than the 
work of the Supreme Court, or even courts in general; it must also include the 
work of the federal and state governments and other unspecified government 
actors.27 
Strauss’s living Constitution is what I call the Constitution-in-practice: a set 
of laws, institutions, doctrines, and practices that evolve over time.28  Although 
 
23 See STRAUSS, supra note 1, at 51-76 (tracing the development of First Amendment 
law); id. at 77-97 (discussing Brown v. Board of Education and Roe v. Wade); id. at 33-49 
(describing common-law development in the courts). 
24 STRAUSS, supra note 1, at 118-122. 
25 Id. at 132-36 (offering the example of the Seventeenth Amendment). 
26 Id. at 126-32 (offering the examples of the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth 
Amendments). 
27 See id. at 35 (stating that precedents of the Supreme Court and traditions and 
understandings that have developed outside of the courts “form an indispensable part” of 
our living Constitution). 
28 BALKIN, supra note 13, at 35, 49, 69 (distinguishing the Constitution from the 
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Strauss foregrounds Supreme Court decisions in his book, most of the 
Constitution-in-practice is never interpreted by the courts.  It includes the 
hardwired parts that nobody ever litigates – for example, the length of the 
President’s term, or the number of houses of Congress.  But it also includes 
other shifting practices that are never litigated: the filibuster rules in the U.S. 
Senate, the conditions under which the President exercises his veto, and the 
relationship between Congress and the President.  Inter-branch controversies 
are generally resolved through a combination of political diplomacy on the one 
hand and political pushing and shoving on the other.  Perhaps equally 
important, there is the law of the executive branch, which includes the 
construction, over time, of the national security state and the national 
surveillance state.29  Although some of this construction is touched on by 
courts, most of it never is. 
Focusing on these constructions is valuable not only because they 
complicate the picture of constitutional development but also because they 
offer a different account of what courts do.  The idea of common-law decision 
making suggests that courts simply adapt to social change through deciding a 
series of cases.  But an equally important feature of judicial practice is regime 
maintenance. 
At any point in time, Americans live within what political scientists call a 
constitutional regime.30  A constitutional regime combines a range of beliefs 
about constitutional meaning together with a set of accepted, customs, 
practices, and institutions.  Thus, a constitutional regime includes (1) basic 
principles and assumptions about constitutional rights, duties, and powers and 
the proper role of government and (2) the institutions and practices that grow 
up around these principles and assumptions. 
Our current constitutional regime includes, for example, Social Security, 
Medicare, and other social safety-net programs; national fair labor and 
consumer protection standards; federal workplace safety and environmental 
protection regulations; a large federal bureaucracy to carry out these programs; 
centralized fiscal and monetary policies; an enormous peacetime defensive 
capability complete with elaborate intelligence programs and permanent 
standing armies, ships, and missiles positioned around the world; civil rights 
laws that limit not only the state but also reach private parties in the areas of 
housing, education, and public accommodations; the Voting Rights Act and 
 
Constituiton-in-practice). 
29 Jack M. Balkin, The Constitution in the National Surveillance State, 93 MINN. L. REV. 
1 (2008) (describing features of the national surveillance state). 
30 On the idea of a constitutional regime, see generally BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE 
PEOPLE: TRANSFORMATIONS (1998); MARK V. TUSHNET, THE NEW CONSTITUTIONAL ORDER 
(2003); KEITH E. WHITTINGTON, POLITICAL FOUNDATIONS OF JUDICIAL SUPREMACY: THE 
PRESIDENCY, THE SUPREME COURT, AND CONSTITUTIONAL LEADERSHIP IN U.S. HISTORY 
(2009).  See also STEPHEN SKOWRONEK, THE POLITICS PRESIDENTS MAKE: LEADERSHIP FROM 
JOHN ADAMS TO BILL CLINTON 50-51 (1996) (explaining regimes in terms of presidential 
leadership). 
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other regulations of democratic practice; equal rights for women; elaborate 
rules of criminal procedure; and robust free-speech protections.  Many 
elements of this regime are not themselves judicial decisions.  Rather they 
arose from state-building constructions by the political branches that were 
ratified or supported by the judiciary.  Although Strauss tends to emphasize the 
holy trinity of precedents, practices, and traditions, much of the constitutional 
regime is institutional and was built through statute and administrative 
regulation.  Judicial doctrines of constitutional law, which are part of the 
regime, largely conform to the basic assumptions of the regime and 
simultaneously police and legitimate existing institutions and practices.31 
Successive constitutional regimes both build on and reject parts of previous 
regimes, so that they form a crazy quilt of practices and constructions from 
different eras.  Our current regime cobbles together the New Deal, the national 
security state, and the civil rights revolution, as well as aspects of the Reagan-
era transformations that came with the rise of conservative political 
movements in the late twentieth century.  It also includes the emerging national 
surveillance state – which emphasizes the collection and collation of data to 
identify and solve problems of governance. 
The federal courts are part of the existing constitutional regime.  Much of 
what courts do is maintain the regime, legitimate it, and police it.  One reason 
why courts play this role is that the people who get to be federal judges are 
selected by politicians who, on the whole, are dedicated to the regime and its 
basic commitments.  As a result, federal judges tend to play a conservative – or 
rather, conserving – role. The judges who sit on the federal courts were 
generally appointed by the last four or five administrations, and so they tend to 
reflect the political assumptions – and ideological controversies – of the 
relatively recent past.  Therefore, as a group – for there is always variation 
among the various members of the federal judiciary – judges tend to protect 
and promote the regime’s basic assumptions or commitments. Nevertheless, 
regime theory also explains how constitutional revolutions occur.  The 
composition of the federal judiciary is always changing, as newer judges and 
Justices replace older ones, thus shifting the beliefs and assumptions of the 
group as a whole.  Politicians who successfully challenge some of the regime’s 
commitments replace existing judges and Justices with a new set with different 
views.32  Thus, the Reagan Administration emphasized the appointment of 
federal judges who would take constitutional law in more conservative 
directions, cutting back on and in some cases reversing earlier liberal 
precedents. 
 
31 On the role of courts in regime maintenance and enforcement, see generally 
WHITTINGTON, supra note 30, at 85-86, 105-07. 
32 For a discussion of how “partisan entrenchment” in the judiciary leads to constitutional 
change, see Jack M. Balkin and Sanford Levinson, The Processes of Constitutional Change: 
From Partisan Entrenchment to the National Surveillance State, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 489 
(2006). 
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In a constitutional regime, each branch of government plays a role.  To some 
extent the branches compete; to some extent they cooperate, and the regime is 
reproduced over time as a result of these interactions.  Federal courts in 
particular play a key role in regime maintenance because they legitimate and 
police the existing regime; they tend to protect the basic assumptions of the 
regime and enforce its commitments against political opponents (including 
outlier jurisdictions).  They continue the work of regime maintenance until, as 
a result of repeated political success, new judges gradually replace old ones 
and begin to legitimate the resulting changes in assumptions and commitments. 
Thus, during the 1930s, the Supreme Court defended the old order of 
assumptions about the role of the federal government and the meaning of 
contractual liberty until, after sustained political mobilizations and repeated 
electoral victories, the Democrats, led by Franklin Roosevelt, began to stock 
the federal courts – and especially the Supreme Court – with advocates of the 
New Deal and its significantly different assumptions about federal power and 
judicial review.  The new judges and Justices began to legitimate the work of 
the political branches in a series of landmark decisions, which were reaffirmed 
repeatedly over time.  Similarly, during the civil rights revolution, the Warren 
Court cooperated with a bipartisan coalition of liberals and moderates to 
uphold and legitimate new civil rights legislation.  Equally important, the 
Warren Court repeatedly exercised judicial review to promote liberal political 
ideas shared by the dominant forces in national political life, overturning a 
series of older doctrines and enforcing liberal interpretations of the 
Constitution against outliers in state and local governments, particularly in the 
South.  The Supreme Court did not always agree with the judgments of the 
dominant forces in national politics.  Yet on the whole it ratified and 
legitimated political practice.  Legitimation, after all, is Janus faced.  It 
specifies what one can do by also specifying what one cannot do.  In particular, 
courts legitimate by upholding some practices and explaining why they are 
legitimate and, conversely, by offering limits on the exercise of government 
power. 
The idea of regime maintenance offers an alternative picture to Strauss’s 
model of common-law development.  Courts are not simply keeping their ears 
to the ground and adjusting to changing times and mores; instead they are 
actively participating in the construction of the dominant regime and 
legitimating it as well.  Sustained and successful political mobilizations, such 
as those during the New Deal and the Civil Rights Revolution, may lead to 
quick shifts in doctrine – indeed, constitutional revolutions – that look very 
different from the common-law model of gradual adjustment. 
The point is not that the doctrinal development that Strauss describes is an 
illusion.  Rather, the point is that we must account for it differently than 
Strauss does.  First, the nature of this development cannot be understood 
through an examination of judicial opinions of the kind that Strauss offers us in 
chapters 3 and 4 of his book.  Second, and perhaps more important, although 
Strauss calls this species of change “common law” development, it may not 
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primarily concern the conservation of wisdom or past traditions.  Rather, 
judicial development of doctrine concerns the ways that courts operate – and 
cooperate – within a constitutional regime. 
Third, the traditional model of common-law development sees judges as 
responsive to something called “society,” rather than to changes in and 
challenges to a constitutional regime.  But there may not be a single thing 
called “society”; rather, social life may be quite heterogeneous and 
differentiated into various institutions and subcultures, featuring struggles for 
power and recognition among many different kinds of institutions and groups.  
If society is heterogeneous in this way, then saying that through common-law 
decision making judges respond to society may not tell us very much that is 
helpful or interesting.  What we want to know is what elements, institutions, or 
aspects of social life judges respond to and why.  If society is heterogeneous 
and institutionally differentiated, its interests and values may not be unitary or 
even coherent; they may be competitive and fractured.  Society may not have a 
clear or coherent set of mores, needs, or demands that common-law decision 
making could respond to; rather, social life may feature a complicated mixture 
of claims made by different groups and interests that are constantly shifting 
and evolving.  If we argue, as Strauss does, that in common-law decision 
making, “precedents evolve, shaped by notions of fairness and good policy,”33 
the problem reasserts itself in a different way.  Within a heterogeneous and 
differentiated society the question is whose conceptions of fairness and good 
policy the common-law process responds to, and why. 
II. COMMON-LAW DECISION MAKING OR DEMOCRATIC 
CONSTITUTIONALISM? 
Strauss uses an idea familiar to all lawyers – the common law – to explain 
constitutional development.  Because the idea is so comfortable and so 
familiar, we may assume that we understand it. 
But perhaps we do not.  At one point in the book, Strauss speaks of the 
common law as an ideology, by which he means a mode of belief, or a way of 
thinking.34  I agree, but the common law is also an ideology in another sense: it 
is a mystification or disguise. 
We have already seen an example of this.  Regime maintenance is a key 
aspect of the work of federal courts.  The traditional vision of the common law 
does not capture it.  Rather, it obscures it.35  Strauss offers the familiar notion 
 
33 STRAUSS, supra note 1, at 36. 
34 Id. at 40-41 (arguing that the “attitudes of humility and cautious empiricism . . . taken 
together, make up a kind of ideology of the common law[, which was] systematically 
elaborated by some of the great common law judges of early modern England”). 
35 Moreover, the common law of eighteenth-century England might operate very 
differently from the way that federal judicial decision making operates in twenty-first-
century America.  And it might serve additional – or different – functions. 
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that the common law builds on and conserves the wisdom of the past.36  But 
how this happens is not clearly explained or easily understood. 
The notion that the common law generates and preserves wisdom is based 
on two ideas: polling and connection to custom.  The first idea is that the 
common law polls many different decision makers’ views, and through a 
combination of competition and consensus, it gradually selects the best ones.  
Multiple courts, scattered in various jurisdictions, focus on similar problems 
and eventually settle on the best solutions.  (In fact, in the United States, with 
its fifty different state jurisdictions, there is no guarantee that state courts will 
actually agree on a single answer.)  Various courts are polled through litigation 
and asked their opinions in a sequence of different factual situations, and 
eventually, it is hoped, their answers will coalesce.  In this respect, the 
common-law method seeks the “wisdom of the crowd.”  If many judges in 
many different jurisdictions facing many different fact patterns come to believe 
that a particular solution to a legal question is a good one, then it probably is a 
pretty good idea or at the very least not a bad idea. 
The second source of the common law’s wisdom is that the traditional 
common law always had its ear to the ground, so to speak.  It was connected to 
and informed by the customs and mores of the people, whether the English-
speaking peoples or the American people or some other formula.  How and 
why courts – who were generally drawn from the most elite levels of society – 
were responsive to the customs and mores of ordinary people is not always 
explained, but the basic idea is that the common law originated in a sort of 
codification of custom, and ever since common-law judges have adjusted 
doctrine by paying attention to changing customs.  Custom, in turn, is wise 
because it arises from repeated social interactions.  These repeated social 
interactions are like a repeated game that tends toward equilibrium solutions 
that are satisficing – good enough for present purposes – or that, over time, are 
likely to produce satisfactory results.  If the common law was connected to 
custom, and if custom was wise, then the common law was wise. 
By themselves, however, these arguments do not offer an adequate account 
of why common-law decision making would promote wisdom in American 
constitutional law, especially if one focuses on the work of the U.S. Supreme 
Court.  The United States has a single federal Supreme Court and a 
hierarchical system of courts.  Lower federal courts must follow the Supreme 
Court, even if they disagree.  In addition, the Supreme Court employs a system 
of stare decisis, in which the Court generally follows its own precedents, just 
as lower courts generally follow their own precedents. 
Within such a formal structure, one is unlikely to get the kind of polling that 
is necessary to produce wise decision making.  Effective polling is unlikely 
because once the Supreme Court decides something, the lower courts must 
 
36 STRAUSS, supra note 1, at 38, 41 (describing the common law as “the collective 
wisdom of other people who have tried to solve the same problem”). 
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obey it and cannot revisit it.  At most they can distinguish previous opinions, 
but otherwise their views that precedent is mistaken do not count. 
The second justification of the common law’s wisdom – that courts have 
their ears to the ground and are nourished by the wise customs of the people – 
doesn’t really explain the Supreme Court’s work very well.  The Supreme 
Court doesn’t take very many cases, and it controls its own docket.  Moreover, 
if common-law judges were traditionally drawn from elite circles, that is 
probably even more true of the Justices of the Supreme Court. (In fact, state 
court judges, who are often elected, are far more likely to be connected to the 
values and mores of ordinary citizens than the average member of the Supreme 
Court.)  Thus, the Supreme Court doesn’t seem particularly responsive to 
custom – at least in comparison to other institutions – or if it is, we would have 
to explain its responsiveness very differently from how we explain the mystical 
connections between common-law courts and the customs of the English-
speaking peoples. 
Finally, the very idea of “custom” seems altogether too romantic and 
homogenous to describe a complicated modern society like the United States.  
Technological and demographic change is often rapid, and the country is full 
of different groups, institutions, and subcultures. 
We can resuscitate the ideas of polling and connection to changing mores, 
but we have to do it in a different way. 
Take the development of modern First Amendment law as an example.  
Strauss devotes an entire chapter to showing how, through common-law 
evolution, the Supreme Court moved to its modern libertarian doctrines.  Not 
surprisingly, Strauss’s graceful discussion is strongly court-centered, focusing 
on how dissenting opinions by Justices Brandeis and Holmes in the early part 
of the century were adopted by Justices in later years, albeit with temporary 
deviations from the evolutionary path during the McCarthy Era.37  Yet with 
such a small sample of cases, it is very hard to figure out how this process 
either conserves or generates wisdom over time.  Focusing on how dissents by 
Justice A in 1920 were picked up by Justice B in 1940 or Justice C in 1960 
makes the story too much about individual judicial heroism – or individual 
judicial predilections.  In other words, it seems to involve precisely what 
conservative originalists most object to about living constitutionalism. 
Yet even though Strauss talks almost exclusively about Supreme Court 
cases in this chapter, he surely understands that much was going on outside the 
courts.  And we can learn much more about freedom of expression in America 
if we look beyond the sequence of cases he elegantly describes.  If we turn our 
attention to the political branches, political and social mobilizations, and the 
institutions of civil society, we can find a more powerful explanation for the 
development of First Amendment doctrine in the twentieth century, one that 
begins not in the 1920s, but at the country’s founding.  
 
37 Id. at 62-76 (describing the evolution of free expression law since World War I). 
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The ideas that Holmes and Brandeis offered in their early twentieth century 
dissents were not new.  They had been around in American political culture for 
a long time.  During the controversy over the Sedition Act of 1798, an 
emerging political party, the Jeffersonian Republicans, had argued for a new 
account of freedom of speech based on the theory of popular sovereignty.  The 
English common-law rule limited freedom of speech to bans on prior restraints 
and protected only the statements of members of Parliament.  This may have 
made some sense in an empire based on the doctrine of Parliamentary 
sovereignty.  But it made no sense in a republic where the people themselves 
were the sovereigns.  The public had to be able to discuss – and thus criticize – 
government officials and their policies without fear of punishment.  Indeed, as 
actually occurred during the ratification debates, the people had to have the 
ability to advocate the overthrow of existing institutions (the Articles of 
Confederation) and their replacement by a new constitutional order.38  
These ideas about freedom of expression were not well developed in federal 
judicial doctrines – there was very little opportunity during the nineteenth 
century – but they became an important part of American political culture in 
the new republic.39  Sometimes these views were ascendant, and sometimes, as 
in the fights over abolitionist mailings in the South and antislavery petitions 
before Congress, they were honored in the breach more than the observance.40  
But they remained a vibrant part of the American constitutional tradition, even 
if sometimes as part of a dissenting tradition.  They simply weren’t legalized in 
the sense of being part of official Supreme Court doctrine.  Moreover, the basic 
idea of a right to speak freely on a wide range of political subjects was often 
presumed in legal debates and was recognized in different ways in common-
law and statutory decisions.41 
 
38 See the excellent discussion in AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA’S UNWRITTEN 
CONSTITUTION (forthcoming 2012) (manuscript at 51-54) (on file with author). 
39 The election of 1800 played an important role in establishing the Republican view. 
Once he became President, Jefferson pardoned all of the people convicted under the 
Sedition Act, and in 1840 Congress reimbursed all of the fines, accompanying the bill with a 
committee report declaring that the Sedition Act was “unconstitutional, null, and void,” and 
adding that “[n]o question connected with the liberty of the press . . . was ever more 
generally understood, or so conclusively settled by the concurring opinions of all parties, 
after the heated political contests of the day had passed away.”  See Act of July 4, 1840, 
c. 45, 6 Stat. 802, accompanied by H. R. Rep. No. 86, 26th Cong., 1st Sess. (1840), CONG. 
GLOBE, 26th Cong., 1st Sess.  411 (May 23, 1840); AMAR, supra note 38, (manuscript at 
169). 
40 See generally MICHAEL KENT CURTIS, FREE SPEECH, “THE PEOPLE’S DARLING 
PRIVILEGE”: STRUGGLES FOR FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION IN AMERICAN HISTORY (2000) 
(describing antebellum struggles over freedom of expression). 
41 DAVID M. RABBAN, FREE SPEECH IN ITS FORGOTTEN YEARS 2 (1997) (“Disputes over 
free speech had previously arisen in an enormous variety of contexts, ranging from political, 
labor, and sexual radicalism to commercial advertising and election reform.  Judges, law 
professors, officials at all levels of government, activists, social thinkers, and diverse 
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In addition, throughout American history various social and political 
mobilizations adopted strong claims about freedom of expression, especially 
when they were making unpopular claims about slavery or the injustice of 
American wars or the right to form labor unions or the right to use birth 
control.  Not surprisingly, whenever social and political movements have made 
unpopular or novel political claims, they have also tended to make arguments 
for freedom of speech.  In this way, the American tradition of dissent – on any 
number of different subjects – has nourished the American tradition of freedom 
of expression. 
By the time Holmes and Brandeis wrote their famous dissents, there was 
considerable intellectual ferment on the issue of free expression.  During the 
beginning of the twentieth century many different groups made free speech 
claims, ranging from suffragists to labor activists to opponents of World War I 
to advocates of contraception.  In addition, scholars like Zechariah Chaffee 
were beginning to make the intellectual case for constitutional protection of 
free expression.42  New civil-society organizations like the ACLU and the 
NAACP had formed.  Soon these organizations began to engage in what we 
would now call litigation campaigns to protect freedom of speech, either for its 
own sake or in the interest of social movements for other goals like the rights 
of workers or racial equality.  During the twentieth century, newspapers and 
other mass media became ever more pervasive and powerful organs of public 
opinion.  Mass media have a vested interest in promoting free speech, and thus 
they become an increasingly important interest group for the protection of free 
expression.  Moreover, because the owners of mass media also control the 
media, they also influence public opinion about the importance of freedom of 
expression. 
The New Deal transformation forged modern American liberalism, which 
merged Progressive ideas about regulation of the economy with classical 
liberal ideas about the protection of non-economic rights – including, for 
example, those listed in the Bill of Rights.  Among these non-economic 
liberties, the First Amendment’s guarantees of freedom of speech, press, and 
religion were seen as paradigmatic.43  The emergence of these political ideas 
during the New Deal, in turn, helped produce judicial appointments of liberal 
judges and Justices during the middle of the twentieth century.  Post-World 
 
members of the general public addressed free speech issues throughout the decades before 
[World War I].”).  
42 See, e.g., ZECHARIAH CHAFEE, JR., FREEDOM OF SPEECH (1996) (1920); Zechariah 
Chafee, Jr., Freedom of Speech in War Time, 32 HARV. L. REV. 932 (1919).  
43 See Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105, 115 (1943) (“Freedom of press, freedom 
of speech, freedom of religion are in a preferred position.”); Howard Gillman, Preferred 
Freedoms: The Progressive Expansion of State Power and the Rise of Modern Civil 
Liberties Jurisprudence, 47 POL. RES. Q. 623 (1994); G. Edward White, The First 
Amendment Comes of Age: The Emergence of Free Speech in Twentieth-Century America, 
95 MICH. L. REV. 299, 327-42 (1996) (tracing the history of the preferred liberty idea in the 
1930s and 1940s). 
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War II developments, including the civil rights movement and the sexual 
revolution, also reshaped attitudes about free expression.  Courts did not 
always protect free speech claims – during the McCarthy era, for example, the 
courts largely followed the lead of the political branches, especially in the early 
years of the Cold War.  Nevertheless, taken together, all of these various 
influences helped produce a legal culture that, by the 1960s, was remarkably 
protective of free expression.  The explosion of dissent and protest during that 
decade helped solidify these ideas in constitutional doctrine, as many free 
speech cases were litigated in the federal courts.  Nevertheless, developments 
outside of the courts are far more important than the texts of Supreme Court 
opinions in explaining this evolution; indeed, the Holmes and Brandeis 
dissents became canonized in hindsight because they resonated with the views 
that had won out in mid-century constitutional culture. 
The same point applies to other examples of doctrinal development; if we 
focus primarily on common-law development within opinions, we will miss 
most of the story of constitutional change.  Take gay rights as an example.  We 
can hardly explain the acceptance of gay rights in 2003 by arguing that the 
ideas in Justice Blackmun’s 1985 dissent in Bowers v. Hardwick44 convinced a 
majority in Lawrence v. Texas45 that the majority opinion in Bowers was 
“unworkable.”  Perhaps courts like to talk in this way, but we need not take 
such statements at face value.  What made Bowers “unworkable” had little to 
do with doctrinal niceties.  Instead, to explain the result in Lawrence, we have 
to begin the story many years before, with the sexual revolution, the rise of a 
gay rights movement, the creation of civil-society organizations devoted to 
promoting gay rights and gay acceptance, and the gradual shifts in cultural 
acceptance of homosexuality that took place outside of the courts.  Indeed, 
Bowers turns out to be important not for what it said but because it energized 
the gay rights movement and gave it increasing incentives to change views 
about sexual orientation in popular culture, in civil society, and in local and 
state regulation.46  Gay rights advocates also organized politically at local 
levels and designed litigation strategies to best promote the legal interests of 
homosexuals.  
Behind doctrinal development is an entire political and legal culture, which 
in turn features a variety of competing civil society institutions, organs of 
public opinion, NGOs, political parties, political and social movements, 
interest groups, and positions of authority and power staffed by particular 
individuals and groups.  The political and legal culture generates, debates, and 
modifies constitutional ideas over time, changing the parameters of what is 
thought reasonable and unreasonable both in the general public and in the class 
 
44 478 U.S. 186 (1985). 
45 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
46 See Douglas NeJaime, Winning Through Losing, 96 IOWA L. REV. 941, 985-89 (2011) 
(“[T]he Bowers defeat increased grassroots mobilization, fundraising, and organizational 
founding, all of which proved vital to a stronger LGBT-rights movement.”). 
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of legal professionals.  Legal professionals, who deal in reason and therefore 
want to be thought reasonable, develop these ideas further.  Some of these 
legal ideas are taken up and championed by different groups and by people and 
institutions in nodal points of authority and power, including members of the 
state judiciary and the federal judiciary.  The appearance of these ideas in legal 
decisions by the U.S. Supreme Court – or even the federal courts as a whole – 
is only the tip of the iceberg or, to return to our previous metaphor, merely the 
leaves of a larger tree. 
Indeed, the institutions of political and legal culture not only nourish 
doctrinal development, they also constrain it.  Theories of constitutional 
interpretation often see constraint of the federal judiciary as a central goal; but 
this is a fool’s errand.  In a distributed complex of federal courts, headed by a 
multimember Supreme Court that controls its own docket, no single theory of 
interpretation is likely to either explain or constrain the work of judges.  
Rather, the constraints on the federal judiciary are largely institutional.  We 
must view the production of legal opinions against the background of how 
people get to be appointed to the federal judiciary (and especially the Supreme 
Court) and how ideas about the Constitution are promoted and developed in 
civil society.  We must take into account the various political and professional 
constraints on judges and the cumulative effects of partisan entrenchment, 
social mobilizations, mass media, NGOs, and litigation campaigns.  When we 
do this, we will see that judges are not free to make things up but in fact are 
limited and shaped by a wide range of institutional features. 
Indeed, the best example may be Justice Scalia’s majority opinion in 
District of Columbia v. Heller.47  Although it is clothed in the language of 
originalism, Heller is the result of years of social and political mobilization for 
gun rights, reflects a wide social consensus for a basic right to bear arms in 
self-defense, and carefully limits the scope of the right so as not to upset 
contemporary values and concerns.  The opinion that best represents the 
triumph of originalism in the Supreme Court is also the opinion that best 
demonstrates how the living Constitution actually works in practice, how it 
mines and articulates ideas in contemporary American society, and how it 
inevitably constrains judges and Justices in their articulations of constitutional 
doctrine.48  Heller also exemplifies the important role of state courts and state 
legislatures in the processes of living constitutionalism.  Federal courts tend to 
ratify views that have been adopted by a large number of different 
jurisdictions.  By the time Heller was decided, over forty states recognized an 
individual right to bear arms in self-defense.49 
 
47 554 U.S. 570 (2008). 
48 See Reva B. Siegel, Dead or Alive: Originalism as Popular Constitutionalism in 
Heller, 122 HARV. L. REV. 191, 192 (2008) (“Heller’s originalism enforces understandings 
of the Second Amendment that were forged in the late twentieth century through popular 
constitutionalism.”). 
49 See Adam Winkler, Scrutinizing the Second Amendment, 105 MICH. L. REV. 683, 686 
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To continue our arboreal metaphor, trees don’t just get up and walk around.  
They are fixed in place by their roots.  Their roots stabilize them, nourish them, 
and keep them alive.  In the same way, an institutional matrix of constraints 
and influences stabilizes, nourishes, constrains, and sustains America’s living 
Constitution. 
Moreover, this model of social influence also vindicates, in a different way, 
the old ideas of polling and custom that traditionally justified the English 
common law.  Indeed, this model probably justifies the common law better 
than the old ideas ever did.  The institutions of American political culture 
allow many different people to articulate and express their opinions in civil 
society, in the media, in NGOs, in litigation campaigns, and in state and local 
legislatures and courts.  They express and modify these ideas repeatedly over 
time.  The continuous development of these ideas is the equivalent of polling.  
Moreover, the process by which federal judges are selected in successive 
administrations, the effect of a multimember court with Justices appointed over 
long periods of time, and the constant influences of mobilizations, litigation 
campaigns, and elite and popular culture on the federal judiciary mean that 
judges do not have to keep their ears close to the ground or consciously 
conform their work to custom.  Rather, social mores are baked into the 
processes by which judges are selected and their work produced.  This process 
is imperfect and contingent and skewed toward the values of the elites from 
whom most federal judges are selected, but it explains the mysterious 
connection between the work of an unelected judiciary and changing mores. 
Saying that courts are connected to “custom” does not do justice to this 
complex process.  It would be better to say that American society is full of 
contrasting mores and views about mores that are perpetually evolving and 
competing with each other.  Instead of a coherent set of customs, it would 
perhaps be better to describe culture – and especially political and 
constitutional culture – as a plain of contestation, a sort of Gramscian “war of 
position” between different elements and groups.  Judges are not simply the 
passive mirrors of this contention; they are influenced by it but also influence it 
themselves, for good and for ill, and their decisions can become alternatively 
sources of legitimation or rallying points for political opposition.  
III. COMMON-LAW ADJUSTMENT AND PARTISAN ENTRENCHMENT 
When Strauss describes common-law decision making in chapter 2, he 
emphasizes continuity and gradual transformation.50  Courts work with 
precedents and concepts until they find that they are unworkable; then they 
reconceptualize the field of precedents, leading to change.  Strauss’s central 
example is the gradual abandonment of the rule of privity of contract in 
Winterbottom v. Wright,51 leading to Justice Cardozo’s famous decision in 
 
(2007) (counting forty-two states that currently recognize an individual right). 
50 STRAUSS, supra note 1, at 33-49. 
51 10 M. & W. 109, 152 Eng. Rep. 402 (ex. 1842). 
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MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co.,52 which held that consumers who had no 
contractual relationship with manufacturers could still sue for negligence.  The 
rule of privity, Strauss explained, proved “unworkable” and became riddled 
with exceptions that showed a clear trend away from the doctrine.53  Therefore 
the New York Court of Appeals was justified in abandoning it.  Strauss argues 
that a similar progression of cases, whittling away at the separate but equal rule 
of Plessy v. Ferguson,54 eventually led to Brown v. Board of Education.55 
This model of slow, relatively gradual case-law development leading to 
reconceptualization and reversal is another example of the ideology of the 
common law.  It conceals as much as it reveals.  The notion that a decision 
becomes “unworkable” because later cases chip away at it suggests that 
doctrines have functions for which they are well or ill-suited and that they lose 
this functionality over time as they become unpredictable, weakened, or 
riddled with exceptions.  But we cannot describe the rejection of older 
doctrines simply in terms of doctrine’s inability to “work” properly.  
Exceptions may be created because some judges – but not others – find the 
older rules unjust or immoral and deliberately seek to limit their scope or, in 
some cases, even cripple them.  In that case, it is not that the doctrine has 
proved unworkable; it is that later judges disagreed with it and a few actually 
sought to undermine it, leading to a self-fulfilling prophecy.  
Moreover, the idea that a precedent has been gradually weakened or made 
unworkable is often in the eye of the beholder.  Supporters will find the 
doctrine perfectly workable, while opponents will see it as incoherent and 
teetering on the edge of extinction.  Take the example of Roe v. Wade.56  Pro-
life conservatives detested the decision and sought to appoint judges who 
would deliberately weaken it and eventually overturn it.  Their objections to 
Roe were not functional – that it did not operate properly; they were political 
and ideological. 
To be sure, the official rhetoric of judges justifying their decisions may draw 
on these apolitical common-law ideas. Within a few years of being appointed 
by President Ronald Reagan, Justice Sandra Day O’Connor pronounced Roe v. 
Wade as “unworkable”57 and “on a collision course with itself.”58  In 
 
52 111 N.E. 1050 (N.Y. 1916). 
53 STRAUSS, supra note 1, at 84 (“The conclusion that the privity regime was unworkable 
and should be replaced by foreseeability was, in a sense, not just Cardozo’s alone.”). 
54 163 U.S. 537 (1895). 
55 347 U.S. 483 (1953); see also STRAUSS, supra note 1, at 85-92 (“Brown can be 
justified as a decision that was reached on the basis of the common law method.”).  Strauss 
does not mention Gong Lum v. Rice, 275 U.S. 78 (1927), which reaffirmed separate but 
equal and applied it to public schools.  Id. at 87 (holding that maintaining separate schools 
for “white pupils and the pupils of the yellow races . . . is within the discretion of the state in 
regulating its public schools and does not conflict with the Fourteenth Amendment”). 
56 410 U.S. 113 (1972). 
57 City of Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, 462 U.S. 416, 454, 459 (1983) 
(O’Connor, J., dissenting). 
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reaffirming Roe nine years later, the joint opinion in Planned Parenthood of 
Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey,59 – co-authored by Justice O’Connor – 
argued in the opposite direction, insisting that “Roe is clearly in no jeopardy, 
since subsequent constitutional developments have neither disturbed, nor do 
they threaten to diminish” the constitutional right to privacy.60 
It should be obvious, though, that these anodyne accounts of common-law 
development conceal a considerable amount about the actual drivers of 
constitutional change.  After Webster v. Reproductive Health Services in 
1989,61 it appeared that Roe would soon be overruled. But people did not 
conclude this because Roe had become riddled with exceptions and had proved 
“unworkable” to some unspecified, pragmatic, apolitical observer.  Rather, 
people expected this because the Republican Party had become a pro-life party, 
Republican politicians kept winning elections, and Republican Presidents kept 
appointing conservative judges to the federal judiciary.  Given practices of 
partisan entrenchment in the judiciary, it seemed only a matter of time before a 
conservative majority delivered the coup de grace to Roe.  At that point, to say 
that Roe had been riddled with exceptions and therefore had become 
unworkable is a bit like saying that a murder victim has become unworkable 
because he or she has been riddled with bullets. 
As we know, the Supreme Court did not overturn Roe.  Casey v. Planned 
Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania dutifully justifies this turnabout 
through the language of the common law.  It stresses that Roe had not been 
made unworkable or undermined by later decisions: “No evolution of legal 
principle has left Roe’s doctrinal footings weaker than they were in 1973.  No 
development of constitutional law since the case was decided has implicitly or 
explicitly left Roe behind as a mere survivor of obsolete constitutional 
thinking.”62  While jettisoning the trimester framework, the joint opinion – 
again, co-written by Justice O’Connor – retained the viability standard that 
O’Connor herself had previously attacked, arguing that “there is no line other 
than viability which is more workable.”63  Yet Roe was preserved not because 
the Justices believed that it reflected the wisdom of the past – indeed, they 
explicitly refused to say this – but because the joint opinion felt that the 
Court’s legitimacy would be put into question by a hasty reversal.64 
Of course, if the Court had overruled Roe, the official explanation might 
look something like Strauss’s account of Plessy or Winterbottom v. Wright: 
 
58 Id. at 458. 
59 505 U.S. 833 (1992). 
60 Id. at 857. 
61 492 U.S. 490 (1989). 
62 Casey, 505 U.S. at 857. 
63 Id. at 870. 
64 Id. at 864-69 (“[T]o overrule under fire in the absence of the most compelling reason 
to reexamine a watershed decision would subvert the Court’s legitimacy beyond any serious 
question.”). 
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Roe had been undermined by later decisions (like Webster) and had proved 
unworkable.  The real question, then, was not whether Roe was actually 
workable or unworkable, but who would get to decide that question and the 
political context in which the question would be presented.  
In the years between Webster and Casey, public opinion shifted strongly 
toward the preservation of abortion rights.  However much pro-life protesters 
denounced Roe, the country as a whole was content to leave Roe in place. And 
once it appeared that Roe might actually be overturned, the public signaled that 
it wanted abortion rights preserved.65  The three Republican appointees who 
co-authored the joint opinion, concerned that overturning Roe would appear 
illegitimate, produced a compromise – maintaining what the joint opinion 
called the “central” elements of the decision,66 while crafting a new doctrinal 
theory of “undue burden.”67  They were joined by two other Republican 
appointees, who wanted to retain Roe completely. 
Why did the Supreme Court behave this way?  The reasons are quite 
complicated, due in part to the vagaries of the appointments process.  
Republicans had made every single Supreme Court appointment since 1969.  
Yet the more senior Republican Justices had been appointed long before the 
party became strongly pro-life, and several of them (Potter Stewart, Harry 
Blackmun, Lewis Powell, John Paul Stevens) actively supported abortion 
rights.  Two of them (Blackmun and Stevens) were still on the Court in 1992.  
Even after the Republican Party became decidedly pro-life in the 1980s, 
President Reagan and President George H.W. Bush found it remarkably 
difficult to ensure a Supreme Court majority to overturn Roe, partly because 
abortion rights were popular with significant segments of the public and partly 
because of the effects of the party system.  Reagan and Bush often faced a 
Democratic-controlled Senate that supported abortion rights and had rejected 
the nomination of Robert Bork because Bork was widely thought to be the fifth 
vote to overturn Roe. 
Moreover, although Reagan and Bush succeeded in appointing strongly pro-
life Justices Antonin Scalia (when the Republicans controlled the Senate) and 
Clarence Thomas (after Thurgood Marshall’s retirement), political 
considerations often tempered their other appointments.  Reagan had promised 
to appoint the first woman Justice – this limited his options, and he settled on 
 
65 BARRY FRIEDMAN, THE WILL OF THE PEOPLE: HOW PUBLIC OPINION HAS INFLUENCED 
THE SUPREME COURT AND SHAPED THE MEANING OF THE CONSTITUTION 328-29 (2009) 
(describing shift in public attitudes and mobilization of pro-choice forces in the years 
between Webster and Casey); Clyde Wilcox, The Sources and Consequences of Public 
Attitudes Toward Abortion, in PERSPECTIVES ON THE POLITICS OF ABORTION 58-60 (Ted 
Jensen ed., 1995) (showing that Webster stimulated organization and fundraising by pro-
choice groups and led to the election of pro-choice politicians). 
66 Casey, 505 U.S. at 879 (“Our adoption of the undue burden analysis does not disturb 
the central holding of Roe v. Wade, and we reaffirm that holding.”). 
67 Id. at 876 (“In our view, the undue burden standard is the appropriate means of 
reconciling the State’s interest with the woman’s constitutionally protected liberty.”). 
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Sandra Day O’Connor, who ultimately proved unwilling to reverse Roe.  In 
1988, Reagan was faced with nominating a Justice during an election year after 
his first two nominees, Bork and Douglas Ginsburg, had been unsuccessful.  
George H.W. Bush, politically weakened by his decision to raise taxes in 1990, 
had no stomach for a repeat of the failed Bork nomination.  All of these factors 
taken together led to three Supreme Court appointments who turned out to be 
moderate on abortion rights: Sandra Day O’Connor, Anthony Kennedy, and 
David Souter.  These three Justices, it turned out, wrote the joint opinion in 
Casey that upheld Roe.  Yet a slightly different balance of forces might have 
led to a different configuration of people in power, a different political context 
of decision, and a different result.  The Court’s personnel – and its work – is 
not simply a mirror of national politics, but it is always affected by it.68 
Such explanations are always messy and complicated, but they reveal the 
various ways that constitutional construction remains in conversation with the 
national political process.  By contrast, an account of the common law in 
which decisions are gradually overturned because judges eventually find them 
“unworkable” does not touch on these strongly political – and strongly 
contingent – features of constitutional development.  Indeed, it obscures them.  
Yet we must pay attention to these and other institutional features of the 
constitutional system if we want to understand how the living Constitution 
actually works in practice.  Such institutional factors include the success of 
mobilizations and countermobilizations, election results, the political demands 
facing presidents, the composition of the Senate, the qualified and confirmable 
candidates available to Presidents at the time of appointment, the role of mass 
media, and the investments of time and effort by civil society organizations in 
reshaping public opinion about constitutional issues and in staging concerted 
litigation campaigns.69 
IV. COMMON-LAW GRADUALISM VS. CONSTITUTIONAL REVOLUTION 
One of the strengths of Strauss’s account is that he recognizes that much 
constitutional change does not occur through sharp breaks with the past.  Many 
aspects – for example, inter-branch relations and the power of the Presidency – 
 
68 Imagine, for example, that Fred Vinson had not died of a heart attack in September 
1953, leading to Earl Warren’s appointment as Chief Justice; that President Johnson had not 
attempted to make Abe Fortas Chief Justice in 1968, leading to scandal and Fortas’s 
resignation; that President Reagan had nominated Robert Bork in 1986 – when the 
Republicans still controlled the Senate – and Antonin Scalia in 1987; or that President 
George H.W. Bush had nominated a more conservative jurist than David Souter in 1990.  
The list of contingencies that might have affected constitutional doctrine is virtually endless. 
69 See generally CHARLES R. EPP, THE RIGHTS REVOLUTION: LAWYERS, ACTIVISTS, AND 
SUPREME COURTS IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE (1998) (showing how litigation campaigns 
are crucial to the protection of rights in a range of different countries); STEVEN M. TELES, 
THE RISE OF THE CONSERVATIVE LEGAL MOVEMENT: THE BATTLE FOR CONTROL OF THE LAW 
(2008) (explaining the role of civil-society organizations in shaping American constitutional 
law).  
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have grown through slow accretion.  Yet although much constitutional change 
can be explained in this way, much cannot.  Sometimes constitutional 
development occurs through decisive breaks and shifts – even revolutions – 
rather than through gradual case-by-case adjustment. 
If constitutional construction by federal courts is part of an existing 
constitutional regime, we might expect that courts will respond to significant 
shifts in politics, especially those that presage a new political era.  Rapid and 
sustained political changes are likely to be followed by rapid changes in 
constitutional doctrine; political revolutions are likely to be accompanied by 
constitutional revolutions.  That is because major political shifts create new 
problems of legitimacy for courts to solve.  Such changes may not occur 
smoothly, and they may feature fairly sharp breaks in constitutional 
understandings.  Changes may occur in particular areas of doctrine or in many 
areas of doctrine at once, as happened during the New Deal and the civil rights 
revolution. 
These developments can’t easily be explained by the common-law model.  
Rather, we must explain the New Deal revolution in constitutional doctrine by 
looking at its political underpinnings and the relationship of federal courts to 
the national political process.  During the Great Depression the incumbent 
Supreme Court Justices were performing their familiar function; they sought to 
preserve the existing constitutional regime in the face of repeated electoral 
victories by Democrats.  The Court’s conserving function, however, ran 
headlong into political mobilizations for a different understanding of 
constitutional powers and liberties.  Roosevelt’s inability to appoint anyone to 
the Supreme Court before 1937 exacerbated the crisis.  Roosevelt was forced 
to rethink the strategy of his New Deal after the Court struck down the 
National Recovery Act; this led to the Second New Deal and a new series of 
reforms.  In this way disagreements between the courts and the political 
branches produced legislative and executive innovation.  Nevertheless, once 
Roosevelt was able to appoint a series of new Justices to the Supreme Court – 
all of them supporters of the New Deal – the Supreme Court began to bless the 
new constitutional regime.  Doctrines quickly shifted in many different areas at 
once, legitimating and explaining the new rules of the administrative and 
regulatory state. 
In the new regime courts played a different role.  Previously they had been 
guardians of federalism and the traditional liberties of property and contract; 
now they deferred to and protected the democratic process, legitimated federal 
intervention in the economy, and embraced judicial restraint in social and 
economic matters.  A common-law model, which tends to view judicial 
practice as part of a continuous tradition of adaptation of old wisdom to new 
circumstances, is not well-attuned to the idea of changes in the judicial role 
itself, as opposed to changes in custom. 
The emerging regime created its own new puzzles.  Chief among them was 
the role of courts in protecting a series of noneconomic rights – many of them 
listed in the Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment – that were now 
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called “civil liberties” and “civil rights.”  The Justices disagreed among 
themselves about how best to articulate these commitments in the new regime.  
Their disagreements, however, should be understood as the consequence of 
judges working out the consequences of a new constitutional regime, and not 
simply as an example of the common law working itself pure over time. 
Similarly, the civil rights revolution, encompassing the Warren and early 
Burger Courts, is better explained in terms of a shift in constitutional regimes 
than in terms of common-law evolution.  During the Warren Court years alone, 
the Supreme Court overturned forty-five cases, more than half the number that 
had been overturned in the nation’s entire history to that point.70  American 
politics was undergoing a revolution, creating a civil rights/civil liberties 
regime laid atop the understandings of the New Deal.  Here again, if we insist 
on forcing these changes into the mold of common-law judges reasoning from 
case to case, we will miss a great deal of what was actually going on during 
this period. 
Earl Warren once said that the most important cases decided during his term 
as Chief Justice were the reapportionment decisions.71  Unlike Winterbottom v. 
Wright, these cases are not the result of gradual chipping away at earlier 
precedents.  If we attend only to the evolution of case law, they seem to come 
out of nowhere.72  But they make considerable sense if we attend to the 
relationship between the Supreme Court and the liberal constitutional regime 
that emerged following the New Deal.73   
Agricultural and rural interests had dominated American politics for many 
years, creating a conservative headwind against progressive legislation.  The 
New Deal coalition made the interests of cities increasingly salient, and 
metropolitan areas were rapidly expanding in population, especially following 
World War II.  People in both parties – and especially liberals in urban areas – 
believed that older districts drawn to benefit rural interests were unfair and 
unjustly hindered popular reforms.74 
 
70 See AMAR, supra note 38 (manuscript at 247) (citing THE CONSTITUTION OF THE 
UNITED STATES: ANALYSIS AND INTERPRETATION app. at 2245-52 (Johnny H. Killian & 
George A Costello eds., 1996) (appendix prepared by the Congressional Research Service, 
compiling “Supreme Court Decisions Overruled by Subsequent Decisions” and listing 
eighty-eight cases overruling precedents pre-Warren and forty-five from the Warren years)). 
71 EARL WARREN, THE MEMOIRS OF EARL WARREN 306 (1977). 
72 Indeed, in Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549 (1946), decided just fifteen years before 
Baker, the Court held that the federal judiciary could not interfere in state decisions about 
legislative apportionment. 
73 See WHITTINGTON, supra note 30, at 127-30 (arguing that the reapportionment cases 
are an example of regime enforcement, because “[b]oth the constitutional principle and the 
political consequences of judicial intervention were in line with the liberal regime”). 
74 The Twenty-Fourth Amendment, submitted to the states in August 1962 and ratified in 
January 1964, also reflected popular dissatisfaction with unfair voting procedures, in this 
case, poll taxes that discriminated against the poor.  The civil rights movement built on 
these attitudes, and repeated demands for a new voting rights act further encouraged 
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Through its reapportionment decisions, the Court cooperated with the 
dominant liberal forces in the national political coalition, promoting their 
vision of what true democracy required.  The Court enforced the constitutional 
commitments of the current constitutional regime, protecting the institutions of 
representative democracy in situations where no other institution effectively 
could.75  Not surprisingly, the Kennedy Administration strongly encouraged 
the Court’s intervention.76  In fact, Baker v. Carr,77 which made the issue of 
apportionment justiciable, was widely approved of by politicians in both 
parties.78  Although some Republicans initially questioned the breadth and 
scope of the one-person-one-vote decision in Reynolds v. Sims,79 politicians in 
both parties quickly adjusted to the new doctrine, and by 1968 it was taken as 
“unquestionable.”80 
The apportionment cases are a good example of decisions that make far 
more sense viewed through the lens of regime commitments than through the 
model of common-law decision making.  Reynolds v. Sims,81 Wesberry v. 
Sanders,82 and their companion cases, far from reflecting common-law 
gradualism, were breathtaking in their reach, affecting some ninety percent of 
congressional districts and almost every seat in state senates and most of the 
seats in the states’ lower chambers.83  Although the reapportionment cases had 
little precedent in judicial reasoning, they meshed well with the new role of 
federal judges as defenders of democracy as opposed to defenders of property 
rights and federalism. 
Similarly, the civil rights revolution, with its focus on the mistreatment of 
African-Americans, led to major changes in judge-made doctrines of criminal 
procedure and freedom of speech.84  Decisions protecting sexual freedom 
 
constitutional ideas about equality in voting rights.  For a history of the Twenty-Fourth 
Amendment and its connections to the civil rights movement and the Voting Rights Act of 
1965, see Bruce Ackerman & Jennifer Nou, Canonizing the Civil Rights Revolution: The 
People and the Poll Tax, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 63 (2009). 
75 See id. at 126-27 (explaining that Justice Clark decided to join the majority because he 
believed that only the Court could provide a remedy, given that legislatures could not 
reform themselves); id. at 129 (stating President Kennedy’s conclusion to the same effect). 
76 Id. at 129. 
77 369 U.S. 186 (1961). 
78 LUCAS A. POWE, THE WARREN COURT IN AMERICAN POLITICS 203-04 (2001). 
79 377 U.S. 533 (1963). 
80 POWE, supra note 78, at 252-55 (“Reynolds went from debatable in 1964 to 
unquestionable in 1968.”). 
81 377 U.S. 533 (1963). 
82 376 U.S. 1 (1963). 
83 POWE, supra note 78, at 252. 
84 HARRY KALVEN, THE NEGRO AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT (1965) (explaining how civil 
rights struggles produced greater protections for freedom of speech); Michael Klarman, The 
Racial Origins of Modern Criminal Procedure, 99 MICH. L. REV. 48 (2000) (tracing 
influence of demands for racial equality on the development of constitutional rights of 
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quickly appeared in the 1960s due to the sexual revolution that also began in 
the 1960s.  These examples do not fit the model of common-law gradualism; 
they make more sense if we view doctrinal development against the 
background of political and social mobilizations and changes in the 
constitutional regime.  
V. COMMON-LAW DECISION MAKING AND DEMOCRATIC LEGITIMACY 
So far I have focused on Strauss’s descriptive account of constitutional 
development.  Now let me turn to Strauss’s normative account. 
Strauss’s book has carefully limited normative ambitions.  Strauss hopes to 
demonstrate that common-law decision making is superior to originalism as a 
method of interpretation because common-law decision making better explains 
what Strauss assumes most people would agree are valuable aspects of 
American constitutional law.  Strauss does not attempt to demonstrate the 
superiority of common-law decision making to other possible theories of 
constitutional interpretation.  He does not attempt a more general justification 
of judicial review, and he does not attempt to show that common-law decision 
making promotes – or at the very least does not undermine – democratic 
legitimacy. 
Strauss notes the potential conflict between his model of common-law 
decision making and democracy.  Nevertheless, he argues that if there is a 
tension between common-law constitutionalism and democratic legitimacy, it 
does not arise from the use of the common-law method.  Rather, it comes from 
the practice of judicial review itself, which he assumes the reader already 
accepts.85 
Even if Strauss is correct, his answer still raises an important question.  
There are many different ways we could design the institution of judicial 
review and many different models of interpretation that we might ask judges to 
adopt.  Some of these designs and methods will be more consistent with 
democratic legitimacy than others.  Some approaches will actually further the 
democratic legitimacy of the entire political system as a whole, while others 
will be in tension with it or undermine it, and still others will have effects that 
are neutral or mixed.  Surely we can ask whether the choice of common-law 
constitutionalism is more consistent with, or better promotes, the political 
system’s democratic legitimacy than the alternatives.  Strauss does not address 
this question in The Living Constitution, except by contrast with certain forms 
of originalism.  He does not make the positive case for common-law 
constitutionalism’s contribution to democratic legitimacy other than noting that 
the common law adjusts to changing mores and times. 
 
criminal procedure). 
85 STRAUSS, supra note 1, at 47 (“What makes our system undemocratic is [not the 
common-law method but] judicial review: the practice of allowing the courts to have the last 
word on most issues of Constitutional law.”). 
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Yet common-law decision making does not seem to promote democratic 
legitimacy very much, at least if our primary focus is the Supreme Court and 
the lower federal courts.  Although the common law was traditionally thought 
to have an almost mystical connection to custom, Strauss offers no obvious 
mechanisms that would connect popular will or popular opinion to common-
law development, much less show how common-law decision making furthers 
the democratic legitimacy of the entire political system.  After all, a traditional 
objection to the common law in early America was that common-law judges 
are elites untethered to the mass of society, in contrast to elected 
representatives.  (Indeed, this was one reason why some states moved to 
elected judiciaries.)  If we add to these traditional objections the fact that 
federal judges enjoy life tenure and that they have the power to overturn the 
work of the political branches, the traditional arguments that the common law 
is antidemocratic seem, if anything, more powerful.86 
Nevertheless, given what Strauss does say in the book and in other recent 
writings, perhaps we might offer the beginnings of an answer.  If we attend to 
the roots of the tree rather than its leaves, we might begin to see how common-
law decision making by federal courts promotes – or at the very least does not 
undermine – the democratic legitimacy of the political system.  To do this, 
however, we must displace the judiciary as the central player in the living 
Constitution.  The federal courts are only one actor among many.  Overlapping 
institutional constraints cause courts to play their distinctive role in the larger 
national political system, while the political branches busily engage in their 
own state-building constructions.  Through this process, courts produce 
doctrines that, in the long run, are responsive to the national political process 
and promote the democratic legitimacy of the entire system over time.87 
First, as noted above, the federal judiciary is constrained by a series of 
institutional factors, including the judicial appointments process and the 
practice of partisan entrenchment.  Judges are also influenced – whether 
consciously or unconsciously – by successive waves of social and political 
mobilizations, by changes in public opinion, by the efforts of civil-society 
institutions to introduce new ideas and alter current ones, and by legislative 
and litigation campaigns.  In addition, the most controversial decisions on a 
multimember court like the Supreme Court tend to be strongly influenced by 
the median Justices, whose identity shifts through the sequence of presidential 
appointments.  These median justices, in turn, tend to be closer to the middle of 
elite and public opinion at any time; not surprisingly, they also tend to be the 
primary objects of persuasion by social and political mobilizations.  Because 
Justices and judges are usually selected from professional and political elites, 
they tend to reflect the views of conservative or liberal elites where those 
 
86 See id. at 46-47 (canvassing but rejecting various arguments that the common law is 
undemocratic). 
87 The paragraphs that follow summarize a much longer argument in BALKIN, supra note 
13, at chs.13 &14. 
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views differ from those of the general public.  In the long run, however, elite 
and popular views tend to converge on a wide range of subjects. 
Second, the federal judiciary does not simply mirror public opinion, 
although it is responsive to public opinion in the long run.  Rather, the federal 
judiciary is a player in the national political process, and one of its major tasks 
is the legitimation and rationalization of the current constitutional regime.  The 
federal court system, led by the Supreme Court, tends to play a conserving if 
not conservative role, defending existing regime commitments until sustained 
social and political mobilizations change the basic parameters and assumptions 
of national politics.  At that point, federal courts begin to ratify and legitimate 
these changes in constitutional understandings, partly as a result of social 
influence by social and political mobilizations, partly as a result of litigation 
campaigns, and partly as a result of partisan entrenchment.  The constitutional 
struggle over the New Deal – in which the Supreme Court defended the old 
constitutional regime until Franklin Roosevelt was able to appoint new Justices 
– is only the most obvious example of how this process occurs. 
In Living Originalism, I argue that these processes of constitutional 
construction and regime maintenance – and others related to them – constitute 
the “living Constitution.”  Living constitutionalism – at least in my view – is 
not a prescriptive account of how judges should decide cases; it does not offer 
advice to judges about how they should behave in order to make their work 
consistent with democracy.  Instead it describes the processes by which 
constitutional change occurs in all of the different branches of government and 
in civil society, and it explains why these processes, in the long run, promote 
the democratic legitimacy of the system as a whole.88  Rather than identifying 
the living Constitution with common-law decision making, I argue that the 
living Constitution is the product of constitutional construction by all branches 
of government over time.  Some of this construction might be described as 
common-law decision making – by federal and state courts, by administrative 
agencies, and by executive officials.  But this account does not tell us very 
much, for it simply describes change by analogy to the ancient practices of 
British courts without attempting to explain the engines of change in the 
various institutions of government and civil society. 
Could Strauss accept some or all of my argument as a supplement to his 
own?  I think he could, although my account approaches the problem of 
constitutional development from a somewhat different perspective.  In fact, in 
other work, Strauss has offered two ideas that we could easily connect to this 
approach to living constitutionalism, although we would have to explain them 
in different ways. 
 
88 BALKIN, supra note 13, at 278 (describing living constitutionalism as “an account . . . 
of the processes of constitutional decisionmaking, and their basis in democracy and in the 
ideals of popular sovereignty”). 
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Strauss calls the first idea “modernization.”89  Modernization means that 
instead of deferring to tradition and to the wisdom of the past, courts update 
doctrines to take into account – or even anticipate – changes in public 
opinion.90  According to Strauss, courts “identify areas where the laws on the 
books no longer reflect popular opinion.”91  The gap between law and public 
opinion may have several different causes: because legislative reform is 
particularly costly, because of the blocking power of concentrated interests, “or 
because of jurisdictional boundaries that allow some parts of the country to 
continue enforcing a practice that a national majority considers 
unacceptable.”92  Courts tend to strike down laws in outlier jurisdictions that 
have lagged behind a general trend.  Strauss believes that in these cases “courts 
might invalidate statutes in the expectation that they are in fact carrying out the 
will of the people.”93  At the same time, “courts should be prepared to retreat, 
if they find that they have misgauged popular sentiment – that is, if the 
political process reacts by reaffirming the law that has been invalidated.”94 
Strauss’s concept of modernization assumes that courts may actually 
promote representative government when they use the power of judicial review 
to bring law in line with popular beliefs.  Judicial review has “a more 
comfortable place in democratic government,”95 Strauss argues, “[i]f the courts 
are doing no more than bringing statutes up to date, and anticipating changes 
that have majority support – and if they are prepared to retreat if the majority 
turns out not to support them.”96 
Strauss’s second idea is democracy protection or representation 
reinforcement,97 an idea taken from the famous Carolene Products decision98 
and from the work of John Hart Ely.99  Courts have an independent duty to 
ensure the proper functioning of the democratic process, and “the courts are 
justified in setting laws aside only when doing so facilitates the operation of 
 
89 David A. Strauss, The Modernizing Mission of Judicial Review, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 859 
(2009) [hereinafter Strauss, Modernizing Mission]; David A. Strauss, Modernization and 
Representation Reinforcement: An Essay in Memory of John Hart Ely, 57 STAN. L. REV. 761 
(2004) [hereinafter Strauss, Modernization and Representation Reinforcement]. 
90 Strauss, Modernizing Mission, supra note 89, at 860. 




95 Strauss, Modernizing Mission, supra note 89, at 861. 
96 Id. 
97 David A. Strauss, Is Carolene Products Obsolete?, 2010 U. ILL. L. REV. 1251 
[hereinafter Strauss, Is Carolene Products Obsolete?]; Strauss, Modernization and 
Representation Reinforcement, supra note 89, at 762. 
98 United States v. Carolene Prods. Co, 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 & n.4 (1938). 
99 JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW (1980). 
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democracy by making the political process work in the way that it should.”100  
Strauss is well aware of the difficulties inherent in the theory of representation 
reinforcement;101 yet, at the end of the day, he argues, it is as good a 
reconciliation of judicial review with democracy as we are likely to get.  
“Despite all its weaknesses,” Strauss argues, the Carolene Products model 
“still gives us a way of thinking about what the courts should do”102 in a 
democracy: “the role of the courts is to make sure that the democratic process 
remains open and inclusive, and that unfairly excluded minority groups are 
protected.”103 
Strauss’s two ideas for reconciling judicial review and democracy – 
modernization and representation reinforcement – bring us a bit closer to the 
vision of living constitutionalism that I offer in Living Originalism.  
Nevertheless, there are still important differences.  Both of his ideas look at the 
issue of democratic legitimacy from the perspective of what courts could do or 
should do to make their work consistent with democracy.  They are normative 
prescriptions about how judges should behave in a democracy, drawn from an 
interpretation of past practices.  Neither idea, however, identifies any 
mechanisms that would cause courts to act in the appropriate way.  Neither 
idea explains why judicial actors would have incentives to modernize law or 
protect the political process. 
Take the notion of democracy reinforcement.  As Strauss well knows, many 
Supreme Court decisions can be seen as either promoting democracy or 
detracting from it, depending on one’s political priors.  A good example is the 
2010 Citizens United decision, which struck down restrictions on corporate and 
union advertising close to primaries and general elections.104  Depending on 
one’s political beliefs, Citizens United either protects democracy by protecting 
freedom of speech or undermines democracy by facilitating greater corporate 
influence in elections.  Examples could no doubt be multiplied by looking at 
the Court’s recent work on commercial speech, voting rights, or race relations 
law.  There is no guarantee that political forces will generate courts that will 
actually promote democracy – at least from Strauss’s perspective.  Therefore 
the representation reinforcement theory is only a theory about how courts 
might promote democracy if they were so inclined; it is not a theory about why 
they might actually do so. 
By contrast, the modernization thesis has a bit more going for it in this 
respect.  We might assume that, all other things being equal, the succession of 
Justices born at different periods in time will reflect very long-term changes in 
public opinion.  In fact, however, modernization is not a promotion of 
democracy per se, precisely because local majorities might want to have rules 
 
100 Strauss, Is Carolene Products Obsolete?, supra note 97, at 1255. 
101 See id. at 1262-67 (describing various problems with the theory). 
102 Id. at 1268. 
103 Id. 
104 Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010). 
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that are different from those in most other places in the country.  Majorities in 
the South in the 1950s and 1960s probably would have preferred to maintain 
racial segregation and a greater presence of religion in public activities and the 
public schools.  But majorities in the North – aided and abetted by federal 
courts staffed by a succession of racially liberal-to-moderate Presidents – 
insisted on imposing their values in order to protect racial and religious 
minorities in the South.105  That is to say, Strauss’s modernization story is 
really a story about nationalization – making state and local governments 
conform to national values – as much as it is a story about democracy or 
keeping up with the times.106 
The ideas of modernization and representation reinforcement helpfully take 
us beyond the account of common-law decision making offered in The Living 
Constitution.  Even so, Strauss offers no causal account of why judicial review 
in practice might promote the democratic legitimacy of the system as a whole.  
Instead, he argues that we can categorize some (but not all) past practices as 
examples of modernization or representation reinforcement and that these 
activities either promote democratic legitimacy or are not inconsistent with it.  
That is, he offers us a normative role that judges might play, but no reasons to 
think that they will play it. 
For example, suppose that, as a result of successive elections and social 
movement mobilizations, the federal courts become stocked with opponents of 
policies that Strauss believes would conduce to the improvement of 
democracy.  Strauss does not offer us good reasons to think that these judges 
and Justices will engage in modernization and representation reinforcement as 
Strauss understands them.  And if nevertheless they end up doing that in some 
situations – say in gay rights cases – Strauss does not have a good explanation 
for why this happened.  He can point out that in these cases – but not others – 
the courts performed their proper role in a democracy, but this does not explain 
why they managed to do so. 
That is why shifting our focus to the processes of constitutional construction 
and to the role that judges play in regime maintenance and legitimation might 
be more helpful.  Instead of asking how judges should behave in order to 
promote democratic legitimacy, we might ask instead how the processes of 
constitutional change operate in practice.  Given the shifts in who staffs 
positions of power and authority in American government, we have no reason 
to believe that the processes of living constitutionalism will always promote 
particular kinds of policies over time, whether liberal or conservative.  What 
we do have reason to believe is that courts will conserve and legitimate the 
existing constitutional regime and its commitments – whatever those may be – 
 
105 Lucas A. Powe, Jr., Does Carolene Products Describe?, 11 CONST. COMMENT. 197, 
209-12 (1994). 
106 Jack M. Balkin, What Brown Teaches Us About Constitutional Theory, 90 VA. L. 
REV. 1537, 1538 (2004) (“Lesson One: The Supreme Court is not Countermajoritarian; it is 
Nationalist.”). 
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and that through the judicial appointments process and the influence of social 
and political mobilizations courts will gradually adjust their doctrines to 
accommodate the views of national political majorities, often bringing outlier 
jurisdictions into line.  This approach reinterprets Strauss’s idea of 
modernization: it is not a normative duty of courts, but a nationalizing effect of 
the processes of constitutional decision making. 
From this perspective, we can also explain why courts engage in something 
called “representation reinforcement,” although it will look a bit different from 
Strauss’s or Ely’s accounts.  We must begin by recognizing that what promotes 
or hinders democracy is judged relative to the ideals and commitments of the 
existing constitutional regime.  It turns out – not surprisingly – that there is no 
single vision of democracy reinforcement. Rather, at any point in time in 
American society there are competing visions of what democracy requires: 
some in ascendance, some in dissent, and some that are completely “off the 
wall.”  We can better explain what courts are doing over long periods of time if 
we attend not to our own theories of what democracy requires but to the 
visions of democracy implicit in the current regime. 
When liberals dominated the national political process, courts offered a form 
of representation reinforcement that more or less corresponded to liberal ideas 
of democracy.  This makes sense of the Warren Court’s apportionment 
decisions, its expansion of the right to vote, its elimination of state poll taxes, 
and its decisions upholding expansive congressional power to regulate voting 
rights in the Voting Rights Act of 1965.  In Democracy and Distrust, John Hart 
Ely noted some of these developments.  He argued that the liberal version of 
democracy reinforcement was actually democracy reinforcing, and he 
concluded that this should be the central goal of judicial review.107  Because 
Ely was himself a liberal and an admirer of the Warren Court, this 
interpretation should come as no surprise. 
But liberals did not dominate politics forever.  When conservative elites 
began to dominate national elections, they stocked the courts with their allies.  
The federal courts began to adopt a more conservative version of 
representation reinforcement, enforcing conservative notions of what 
democracy means and what democracy requires.  Citizens United, the 
contemporary hostility to race-conscious affirmative action,108 and the current 
Court’s narrow construction of voting rights109 are all examples of 
conservative representation reinforcement, reflecting the vision of democracy 
held by conservative elites.110  Liberals might find these views of what 
 
107 ELY, supra note 99, at 73. 
108 See Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701 (2007) 
(striking down race-conscious plans by Seattle and Louisville school boards designed to 
promote racial integration). 
109 See Crawford v. Marion Cnty. Election Bd., 553 U.S. 181 (2008) (upholding Indiana 
photo identification law). 
110 A traditional conservative concern about democracy – reflected in the views of many 
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democracy requires anathema, but no doubt the Warren Court’s vision of 
representation reinforcement was viewed as hostile to democracy by 
conservative elites at the time. 
Regardless of what we believe their true duty to be, the practice of courts is 
not representation reinforcement per se but the protection of democracy as 
imagined by the regime in place, until it is succeeded by a new regime.  The 
shift from one regime to the next may be accompanied – or even driven – by 
changes in reigning ideas about what democracy means and how courts should 
respect and defend it.  That is what happened in the New Deal revolution, with 
its emphasis on judicial restraint, and in the civil rights revolution that 
succeeded it, with its emphasis on minority rights and the promotion of the 
rights to vote and speak.  And that is also what happened when conservatives 
dominated the federal judiciary beginning in the 1980s: they imposed 
conservative visions of racial equality, voting rights, and freedom of speech.  
In this respect, Citizens United offers the conservative version of Ely’s 
Democracy and Distrust.  Justice Kennedy’s opinion worries that because of 
defects in the political process, Congress is trying to snuff out political speech 
by defenseless corporations.  In order to protect the integrity of American 
democracy, corporations must be able to spend as much as they like on 
political advertising. 
Shifts in larger political trends help us understand the Justices’ conservative 
vision of democracy in this, America’s Second Gilded Age.  If we want the 
courts to protect our vision of democracy, we are strongly advised to use the 
admittedly imperfect tools of democracy available to us to change public 
opinion and win elections.  If we succeed, the courts will eventually follow. 
CONCLUSION 
David Strauss has given us an elegant account of constitutional change seen 
through the lens of the common law.  Yet, as Strauss himself acknowledges, 
the common law is an ideology, and ideologies, no matter how useful for some 
purposes, can also be misleading.  In this case, the trope of common-law 
development conceals and mystifies other forces that shape the development of 
constitutional law.  Strauss’s story of the living Constitution tells us much that 
is interesting about the development of doctrine in courts, but these are only 
the leaves of the tree of living constitutionalism.  If we want to understand how 
these leaves came to be, the story of common-law decision making needs 
supplementation.  We must also attend to the roots of our living Constitution. 
 
 
of the Framers – is that majorities might attempt to redistribute wealth from the smaller 
number of haves to the larger number of have-nots.  Hence the Constitution should serve as 
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